Colin Wheeler
There has been some late or maybe lack of reporting of trapped and dragged incidents by London Underground. Some time ago trams were all too often involved in similar incidents. Most seem to be the result of individuals trying to beat the closing doors.
At this time of year, vegetation growth may damage structures by spreading roots. In many places sighting distances are compromised and even experienced track workers may underestimate minimum warning times.
Heritage Railways are a national success story but operating them poses its own challenges as is evident from the collision on the Strathspey Railway involving the Flying Scotsman. Other heritage railways would do well to scrutinise their operations in the light of the RAIB report.
Over speeding at Spital Junction Peterborough has now involved three train operating companies resulting in four additional Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) recommendations which hopefully will prevent further incidents.
Pram hits train at Banbury
On 8 June at 12:36, a Reading to York passenger train entered platform 2 at Banbury Station where it was due to stop. As it arrived, a parent and a relative of an infant child in a pram were waiting behind the yellow line with luggage. The parent momentarily let go of the handle of the pram which then rolled towards the platform edge. It made contact with the bodyside of the train’s second coach while the train was still travelling at an estimated 35 mph. The pram spun, tipped over, and the infant fell onto the platform sustaining a minor head injury. The RAIB has decided to issue a Safety Digest about this accident.
Trapped and dragged at Enfield
A passenger was trapped and dragged on 17 July at Enfield Town Station. At 18:07 that evening the passenger attempted to board a train as its doors were closing. The train set off with the passenger’s hand trapped in its doors. The passenger ran alongside the train but soon lost their footing. Other passengers alerted the driver who then stopped the train and released the doors. During the incident the train reached 11mph and travelled around 60 metres. The RAIB says that the passenger suffered “minor physical injuries and psychological distress”.
Craven Arms near miss
This near miss involved an engineering train and a heavy goods road vehicle at the manually controlled level crossing at Craven Arms. At 10:00 on 22 July, the train was signalled across the crossing while the barriers were raised leaving the crossing open to road vehicles. The engineers’ train narrowly missed hitting the heavy goods road vehicle. No one was injured and no damage was caused.
RAIB will issue a Safety Digest.
Trains damaged at Kings Langley
On 25 April at 06:43, a train ran into an object on the track at Kings Langley. The Wolverhampton to London train struck part of a road/rail access point (RRAP) that had been left on the track. The RRAP had been used the previous night when overhead line work was carried out. Debris and track ballast struck a second train travelling in the opposite direction and some also landed on Kings Langley Station platforms. Fortunately, they were unoccupied at the time. The resultant damage to both trains meant that neither of them could continue in service but neither of them was derailed.
The temporary RRAP had been used for overhead line work. Part of it became lodged under a passing train causing a braking pad to become loose. The detached pad hit another train travelling in the opposite direction. The Person in Charge of Possession (PICOP) was located at the former Watford Junction Signal Box for the 20-mile-long possession. A mobile engineering supervisor managed the relevant work site, and the relevant Controllers of Site Safety (COSS). The overhead line work needed two Mobile Elevated Work Platforms (MEWP). The temporary RRAP consisted of four pieces placed outside the running rails and three between the running rails. Four similar sets were set up to provide the necessary eight metres length. Individual pieces weigh up to 25kg and are manually lifted by two workers, providing an eight-metre long-RRAP.
The work team of 11 included both Network Rail and contractors’ staff. Each MEWP had a machine operator and a controller. Four people were to work from each MEWP together with a manager in charge to track the progress of the work. However, high ballast levels on the Up Fast were “outside the RRAP manufacturer’s installation guidelines” but the team had no shovels with which to reduce the levels. The RAIB report says that the temporary RRAP was probably installed at too high a level.
CCTV from one of the train’s shows a piece of RRAP some 40 metres south of where it was installed. After the work was completed the MEWP’s returned to the access point at 03:00 hours. The MEWP on the Up Fast derailed on the temporary RRAP.
The workers removed remaining pieces of RRAP which were loaded into a flatbed lorry. No component part counts were made to ensure that all 20 parts of the RRAP were accounted for. At 03:15 the PIC confirmed to the engineering supervisor that the line was clear and safe and handed back the worksite. The possession was then given up and train working resumed.
Strathspey Railway collision
On 5 September, RAIB published its report on this accident which happened at 18:05 on 29 September 2023. The Flying Scotsman steam locomotive travelling tender first collided with its livered coaches on the approach to platform 3 at Aviemore Station. The coaches are used on the mainline railway but were to be hauled on the Strathspey Railway by the Flying Scotsman as part of a planned movement to Boat of Garten Station.
The collision at just 7mph happened as the locomotive was moving to be coupled to the coaches. Two people were injured and taken to hospital. There was damage to the tender and the coaches were taken out of service.
RAIB’s report 09/2024 says that the impact caused the leading coach buffer to become locked with the gangway of the locomotive tender. Four coaches were damaged internally with “broken and detached fittings” and “bottles of wine and spirits were dislodged from racks and shelves” as the picture shows.
The RAIB report states bluntly that “the Strathspey Railway Company did not effectively manage the visit of the Flying Scotsman”. The report includes three detailed action recommendations which have already been adopted. Under the heading of ‘Other Actions’ the report includes the comment that “the way in which wine bottles are stored has been modified”.
The report by RAIB identifies “Causal Factors” including the “ambiguity of roles within the cab” and the perception that “the custodian’s representative was looking out and providing direction to the driver when they were not so doing”. Immediately before the collision, the custodian’s representative realised that the locomotive was about to collide with the coaches and shouted a warning just as the driver saw the coaches coming into view. At that time there were six people in the cab of the Flying Scotsman.
RAIB has recommended that Strathspey Railway Company “make any changes needed to its organisation rules and procedures”. Also, it is required to review the implementation of its new standard operating procedure to manage special events and special train planning to ensure it is effective in identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with such events.
Near miss with contractor’s COSS
In mid-August, RAIB published its Safety Digest of this near miss which occurred at Littlehempston, Devon, on 13 March. At 10:44 a passenger train travelling at 54mph had a near miss with the Controller of Site Safety (COSS) who was with a group working using a “separated system of work” which may be used provided individuals remain “at least two metres away from any open line.” The near miss took place on the Paddington to Penzance line near Littlehampton.
The COSS and five track workers were provided by PACE Infrastructure Solutions to Colas Rail. The line has a speed restriction of 60mph reducing to 55mph just past the site of the near miss. Colas had identified minor faults in a section of troughing which were to be corrected using track possessions. However, it had been unable to obtain mid-week possessions, so the works were planned using a separated system with trains running on both lines.
The COSS received two packs: one using separated working and the other for pre-booked line blockages. Colas told the RAIB that they expected the COSS to use the separated option but, if moving nearer than two metres of the line became necessary, work would be stopped, the areas marked, and work completed with the line blocked.
The COSS became aware that the distance between the troughing and the nearest rail was reducing so went ahead southwards to check if the group could continue under a separated system. The COSS became remote from the group so there was no one close enough to warn of an approaching train.
On-train CCTV images show that, due to overhanging vegetation, the COSS was obscured from the train driver’s view until only five seconds before the train passed. The COSS moved clear with just two seconds to spare. The driver reported the near miss to the signaller. The Rule Book is clear and specific: “the COSS is mandated to remain with the work group to advise and observe personally at all times”.
Overspeed at Spital Junction, Peterborough
On 16 September, RAIB released its report 10/2024 on this incident which occurred on 4 May last year. At 09:54, the Grand Central Sunderland to London Kings Cross passenger train went over three sets of points at the excessive speed of 66mph. The permitted speed is 30mph reducing to 25mph. Passengers were thrown from their seats and received minor injuries.
The report says the driver’s expectation was for the train to be routed straight ahead and that “driver awareness was not sufficient to overcome the expectation”. RAIB found that Network Rail and East Coast Mainline train operators “did not effectively control the risk of overspeeding when signalling was changed in 2013” and that, following a similar incident in April 2022, Network Rail does not control the risk where there is a long distance between the approach signal and the junction once a proceed aspect has been given.
RAIB has made four recommendations:
- Grand Central is to review and amend its training and competence management process to provide its drivers with the necessary non-technical skills or additional strategies to manage the risk at signals showing different aspects to those usually encountered.
- Network Rail and train operators are to review the processes by which they derive, share and implement safety learning from accidents and incidents.
- Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) are to review the standards specifying relative brightness of main aspects and junction indicators to understand the effects on conspicuity of the complete signal up to the maximum distance at which the signal is required to be readable.
- Network Rail is to manage the risk of a driver not seeing a route indication because of the gradual reduction of light output of LED signals which reduces over time.
RAIB Chief Inspector Andrew Hall summed up the situation, stating that: “An underlying factor behind this incident was that neither Network Rail or the East Coast Mainline Operators effectively controlled the risk of overspeeding at Spital Junction both at the time the protecting signal was changed in 2014 or following the previous incident in 2022.”
