Colin Wheeler
The privatisation of our railways served a purpose when introduced but many will welcome the introduction of the unifying organisation Great British Railways. Organisational change with a focus of making it easier for railway people to work more closely, safely, and productively is the aim.
The avoidance of accidents and increasing use of the latest signalling, track, and electrification design options will be good for us all and must improve safety. The timing is excellent and should coincide with the 200-year anniversary of the establishment by Robert Stephenson of the very first steam engine railway manufacturing company in 1825 at Forth Banks in Newcastle upon Tyne.
Fatalities and fines
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) has published a timely newsletter. Its investigations and subsequent prosecutions resulted in guilty pleas from Network Rail for both the double trackworker fatality at Margam in South Wales in 2019 and death of a trackworker who was struck by a passenger train at Surbiton in 2021.
The ORR’s investigation found “systematic and wide-ranging safety failures by Network Rail in its measures to protect those working on or near the line from trains.” Network Rail was fined £3.75 million and must pay costs of £175,000 for Margam and £3.41 million for the fatality at Surbiton. At Surbiton the ORR identified failings with the “planning, monitoring and supervision to ensure the workers were adequately protected.”
However, I question the suitability of the processes followed. I accept the end result rightly includes legal costs. In these two cases the fines imposed presumably resulted in Government funding from Network Rail being paid to the ORR which is also funded by Government. Previously, there were cases when individuals were interviewed under caution and could be prosecuted. Was that not a better system? Presumably there is a cost to transferring finance between Government departments?
Recording and monitoring assets
The ORR newsletter advises that they wrote again to Network Rail in February stating that they were “not satisfied that the company is doing all that it should to meet its own standards of recording and monitoring all of its assets.”
The letter to Network Rail stated bluntly that the ORR is “not satisfied with the progress being made.” The letter goes on to insist that the ORR requires “specific actions under health and safety law and are commissioning an Independent Reporter to investigate the systematic issues underlying the historical and current non-compliance with standards.”
The letter then lists three key terms, namely structural examination, structural assessment, and structural capacity. It refers to the dialogue which has been ongoing since 23 May 2023 and reports that only “mixed progress” was achieved by the end of CP6. Under a heading of “Regulatory action and next steps”, the ORR warns that an Independent Reporter’s study will “examine the underlying causes of the current non compliances” and will help to “inform our assessment of whether Network Rail is achieving compliance with the standards in the most efficient way possible given the circumstances.”
ORR requires all risk assessments for non-compliant assets to be completed by 30 April this year and assets for which there is no recorded structural capacity to be assessed by 28 February 2026. The letter bluntly warns that “failure to take these actions will likely result in enforcement action being taken, without further recourse.”
I suggest a review of how, before the attempt at privatisation, British Railways organised the regular inspection of structures. There were 20 or so civil engineering divisions or districts covering England, Wales, and Scotland. Each had a divisional civil engineer and an assistant works as well as a deputy for the permanent way.
Trained structures examiners (mostly time served tradespeople) undertook superficial examinations every year. Detailed ones, including those of tunnels and tunnel shafts, major structures, and so on were usually carried out by qualified engineers in accordance with frequencies dictated by the type and condition of each asset. A detailed examination was carried out every three years for bridges but could be up to six years for tunnels in good condition. The standard was varied as necessary, depending on its defects.
The assistant works posts were occupied by qualified chartered engineers who personally undertook the inspection of any special structures and checked and countersigned all the reports. Copies were provided to the assessment offices at each regional headquarters from whom options for significant repairs or renewal would be processed.
At one divisional office I recall we employed three generations from a single family of time served tradesmen, two of whom worked as structural examiners. The “ask your dad” route to understanding a defect was often useful.
As local qualified engineers, we knew that under our individual health and safety policy statements we were personally responsible for acting in response to the identification of necessary repairs. Difficult and major works proposals were naturally referred to the divisional engineer and, if necessary, even the British Railways Board. Those involved understood the importance of acting on recommendations made in reports.
Prosecutions
When the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was introduced those of us in divisional engineering management jobs were required to develop and use detailed policy statements which set out our individual plans for managing work safely. I still remember difficult conversations with local railway inspectors following accidents and near misses. Locally-based inspectors (employed by what was then Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate) regularly reminded us that we were personally responsible and accountable as were all engineers, supervisors, and other staff.
We individually drafted safety responsibility management statements, and our records of site inspections were checked. We understood that prosecutions after investigations might be forthcoming following formal interviews when there was an accident. Now, the focus now seems to be on prosecuting large organisations with consequent huge fines being imposed by one government organisation onto another, plus legal costs.
RAIB kept busy
On 13 December last year, a passenger train collided with buffer stops at London Bridge Station at around 15:45. The 14:50 Southern passenger service from London Victoria entered the platform at 13.6mph and was still travelling at 2.3mph when it hit the buffer stops. No injuries were reported to either the driver or passengers, but there was minor damage to both the train and the buffer stops. An RAIB investigation is underway.
Derailment at Roudham Heath, Norfolk
On 3 February, RAIB released its report on a passenger train derailment at Roudham Heath, Norfolk, although the accident occurred on 6 February 2024. The train was travelling at 83mph when it struck two trees which had fallen onto the track. It derailed and travelled 680 metres before coming to a stop. One of the 31 passengers suffered a minor injury, both the railway infrastructure and train were damaged, and the line was closed for repairs.
The two trees were part of a forest adjacent to the railway, owned and managed by Forestry England. A twin-stemmed pine tree fell first which landed on and brought down an adjacent oak. The pine tree “suffered from loose root anchorage primarily because it was standing in highly saturated sandy soil”. Due to the way the tree had grown and its proximity to the railway it was most likely to land over the tracks when it fell. Tree inspections by Network Rail and Forestry England had not identified any cause for concern.
RAIB’s investigation found that the risk from trees standing in saturated soil was not being effectively managed by either Forestry England or Network Rail. There was no significant deformation of the train’s cab and an axle mounted brake disc helped to contain the train’s path during the derailment. RAIB’s report makes two recommendations. Both Network Rail and Forestry England are to review their processes for inspecting and managing trees within falling distance of the railway and consider the effects of soil saturation.
Derailment near Walton on Thames
The RAIB report on this derailment was issued on 14 February 2025. Around 05:40 on the morning of 4 March 2024, the train struck a piece of redundant rail that had been left foul of the track on the approach to the station. The train was travelling at 85mph. The front coach derailed, and the train came to a stand around 500 metres beyond the point of derailment.
The redundant length of rail had been left when the previous weekend’s work was completed. Checks made failed to identify that the rail was in a potentially hazardous position before the railway was handed back the previous weekend. The person in charge who supervised the work, and a track hand-back engineer, had not been adequately briefed on the work undertaken before they inspected the track.
The RAIB report says that arrangements for planning and delivering the work failed to adequately manage the risk of a piece of rail being left foul of the running rail. The process for inspecting the railway after the work was completed did not provide staff with clear guidance on the areas to be checked. Relevant railway rules and standards did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities needed to safely deliver work on a complex worksite like the one involved in the accident.
The RAIB report makes two recommendations. First, Colas Rail with Network Rail are to review the rules and standards relating to how tasks delivered in complex worksites should be coordinated and supervised. Secondly, they are to create a coherent process for confirming that the line is safe for the passage of trains after work is complete.
Two learning points were also identified. The first reinforced the importance of adequate site lighting whilst the second stressed the importance of organisations ensuring that guidance material is removed from resource libraries when new standards are issued.
Fatal accident at footpath crossing
This tragedy occurred on the morning of 23 January and RAIB announced its investigation on 17 February. It was around 08:04 when the child was struck and fatally injured on this crossing which is between Whyteleafe and Kenley. The crossing provides access between two areas of Kenley, and has signage, gates, and instructions telling users how to cross. The train involved was travelling at about 50mph. RAIB’s investigation is underway.
Over speeding in South Wales
On 27 January between 11:33 and 14:08, at least eight trains did not observe blanket speed restrictions of 50mph at two locations along the South Wales Main Line.
The restrictions were because of forecast high winds between Neath and Swansea and the hazard from high risk trees between Bishton and Newport.
Some trains travelled “at speeds significantly above the imposed restrictions” but there were no reported consequences.
On 24 February RAIB announced its investigation and will publish a Safety Digest.
Image credit: RAIB
