Colin Wheeler
As the railway returns to public possession, there is an opportunity to rekindle a culture of pride and responsibility across the industry. This is not simply a structural change, but a call to those who work on and for the railway to take ownership of its success and reputation.
In the early years following nationalisation, a strong sense of duty underpinned the workforce, with individuals striving to do their best not just in their roles, but for the railway as a whole. That ethos should be revived. Alongside this, there is value in recognising the role of informal collaboration and local knowledge in delivering effective outcomes. Experience shows that when teams communicate openly and take collective responsibility for planning and delivery, the results can surpass those achieved through rigid processes alone.
Re-establishing this balance between professional pride, accountability, and practical cooperation will be essential in shaping a more resilient and trusted railway.
In the meantime, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) continues to carry out a steady and substantial programme of work, as illustrated by the following examples…
Near miss at Helpston level crossing
During this incident, the signaller on duty at Helpston signal box used the ‘raise barriers’ control for Helpston MCB level crossing, having forgotten that a freight train was approaching the crossing. The barriers became fully raised, and the wig-wag road traffic lights extinguished, while the freight train was still on the crossing. The signaller then realised what had happened and used the ‘lower barriers’ control to start the lower sequence.
One of the waiting car drivers started to move their vehicle towards the crossing after the barriers started to rise. There is conflicting witness evidence about how far the car moved. The train driver did not report seeing any road vehicles enter the crossing as the train approached and no road vehicles were struck by the passing train. No one was injured in the incident and no damage was caused.
An RAIB investigation released on 9 March found that the signaller on duty used a sealed release to manually raise the barriers. Normally, the interlocking system prevents barriers from being raised if a train is approaching or a route is set. After two passenger trains had passed, the signaller attempted to raise the barriers but was prevented by the system because a freight train was approaching on the Up Stamford line.
Believing the barriers had developed a fault – based on a recent barrier failure experienced at this level crossing) – the signaller used a sealed release plunger to override the safeguards. The paper seal intended to deter misuse had been broken four months earlier and had not been replaced. The investigation found the signaller had routinely used the sealed release due to a local practice that was inconsistent with Rule Book requirements and had not been detected through assurance processes.
Derailment at Darlington North Road
At around 13:19 on 31 January 2026, a passenger train derailed and then rerailed at Hopetown Junction, near to Darlington North Road station, County Durham.
This train had been routed over the crossover at Hopetown Junction and on to the Bishop Auckland single line towards Shildon. Train crew were initially unaware of the derailment and consequently the train continued its journey to Shildon.
Examinations of the track and train revealed that “several wheelsets derailed and then re-railed at Hopetown Junction within the length of the crossover.” Train crew, including the driver, were only made aware of the incident after the train arrived at Shildon.
An RAIB spokesperson said: “We have undertaken a preliminary examination into the circumstances surrounding this incident. Having assessed the evidence which has been gathered to date, we have decided to publish a safety digest.”
Fatality at Dimmocks Cote level crossing
At around 15:00 on 3 March, a train collided with a car on this crossing at Stretham near Ely. The car had two occupants, one of whom was pronounced dead at the scene and the other injured. The crossing is unmanned and is self-operated by drivers of road vehicles. The train was operated by CrossCountry Trains and the crossing is between Waterbeach and Ely.
Trapped and dragged at Ealing Broadway
RAIB report 01/2026, issued on 4 March, relates to a passenger being trapped and dragged at Ealing Broadway Station on 24 November 2024.
At 00:09 hours that Sunday at Ealing Broadway a passenger was dragged for about 12 metres along the platform with a hand trapped in the doors as the train departed. The passenger was dragged free by another passenger and a member of staff, only receiving minor injuries.
The train driver had closed the doors while passengers were still leaving and boarding the train. The train doors did not detect the presence of the passengers. The report says that “the train driver was not aware that the passenger’s hand was trapped before initiating the trains departure.”
The report says that MTR Elizabeth Line’s measure used to control risks at Ealing Broadway were not effective and Network Rail did not conduct a thorough risk assessment for the replacement and relocation of a waiting room building.
As a result of this accident, RAIB has made five recommendations.
The first to the new operator of the Elizabeth line, GTS Rail Operations, is to improve how the risks of trap and drag events are understood and controlled. The second is for Transport for London to look to enhance the views of the platform-train interface captured on DOO CCTV and presented to train drivers.
The third recommendation asks Transport for London to evaluate technological options which may further reduce the risk of a passenger becoming trapped and subsequently dragged by a departing train on the Elizabeth line. The fourth recommendation asks the Rail Safety and Standards Board to ensure the rail industry standard for DOO CCTV incorporates latest practice.
The final recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure any changes made to infrastructure on Elizabeth line station platforms have been evaluated and managed appropriately to ensure they do not impact the safety of railway operations and passenger safety.
Fatal accident at Ickenham
Issued on 3 March, RAIB report 02/2026 addresses a fatal accident that took place on 25 March 2025 at Ickenham Underground Station. At 22:30 hours that night a passenger fell from the platform onto the track where they remained undiscovered for two minutes before being struck by a train.
RAIB’s investigation concluded that the individual had lost their balance leading to the fall. The report adds that the passenger was fatally injured and the accident was only discovered after the train’s brakes were automatically applied upon departure due to contact with the passenger.
The report says the passenger was in a vulnerable state after they fell. CCTV evidence suggests that they were probably attempting to move towards the platform face and out of the path of the train. However, the under-platform space was occupied by communication cables.
RAIB has identified two underlying factors. Firstly, London Underground standards relating to under-platform recesses were not being complied with and, secondly, they were not consistent with each other.
RAIB has made three recommendations, all addressed to London Underground. The first recommends that London Underground review its standards relating to under platform recesses to ensure that they are effective and consistent. The second recommends site-specific risk assessments for all station platforms and the implementation of appropriate risk controls. The final recommendation relates to providing operational staff with the necessary guidance and training to safeguard people under the influence of alcohol on the London Underground network.
Two learning points have also been identified. The first is how a thorough track check can be effective in preventing further train movements when a person has fallen onto the track, as was the case in this accident. The second highlights the importance of following company policy with regards to routine drug and alcohol testing following serious accidents.
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